The central role of legal reforms in sustaining economic growth and financial development is widely recognized in India. Exactly what elements of the legal system affect the financial system and how, are less clear. We review the recent literature on law and finance and assess the state of India's legal and judicial system as well as that of its financial system, particularly relative to the rest of the world. It appears that on paper Indian laws provide good to excellent protection to investor rights. Implementation of these laws, however, has been less than satisfactory. Public enforcement of securities laws has been weak and courts in India have been extremely slow and overloaded with cases. Even a decade and a half after the beginning of the reforms process, India still suffers from an excess of red-tape and bureaucracy (not to speak of corruption) poses hurdles to every major aspect of business. Indian financial markets have had limited though increasing depth and survey evidence reveals the preponderance of internal financing among India's small and medium sector firms as well as marked reliance of Indian small businesses on informal networks and institutions like reputation and trus t rather than the formal legal system to enforce contracts and settle disputes.
I. Introduction
Economists have long emphasized the pivotal role of laws and institutions in determining the economic destinies of nations. Indeed the Nobel-prize winning economist Douglass North's explanation of varying economic experiences of societies around the world over centuries centers almost exclusively on institutions. Sanctity and low-cost enforceability of contracts lie at the heart of all economic transactions and hence constitute a basic pillar upholding the economy. Nevertheless, it is only lately that the central role of laws and institutions of governance in determining the evolution and structure of a country's financial system is being probed empirically in a systematic manner. Since the late 1990s, "law and finance" is gaining ground as an important subfield of finance (and law) and efforts are on to better understand the effects of legal system and the social institutions in determining the financial environment and the financial decisions of individuals and businesses.
Nowhere is this inquiry more relevant than in India today. For a decade and a half India has been shedding its decades-long practice of state-controlled economy in favor of greater market orientation. Liberalization is breathing new life into financial markets and private enterprise. Wide ranging changes have been brought about in financial and business regulations. Concurrently and arguably as a consequence, the growth rate has more than doubled from the infamous "Hindu rate" of 3.5%. Nevertheless, sustainability of this high growth rate depends on what is often called "second generation reforms"
focusing on legal and labor reform. While macroeconomic policies have taken the centerstage in the first decade of reforms, there is widespread consensus that a significant overhauling of the legal system is imperative to sustain the initial impetus and to make growth more inclusive. The pace of the reforms process, as always and everywhere, is dictated by political realities and every single element of the reform process has its anticipated effects as well as unintended consequences. At this juncture it is imperative to have a clear understanding of the economic effects of India's legal system and her socioeconomic institutions, particularly the ir impact on the country's financial system.
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) have played a key role in the recent spurt in India's economic growth. They have mushroomed all over the land, employing millions and accounting for a significant fraction of the national output and exports. The business practices of India's SME sector, however, is far from completely documented and understood. As for all businesses, the cho ice of the extent and form of external financing for these firms, as well as their corporate governance mechanisms are determined to a large extent by the enforceability of the contracts they enter into. In the case of SMEs, however, business is frequently done through informal contracting with little or no paper trail. Courts of law rarely play a decisive role in settling their business disputes and informal mechanisms and social institutions play a key role resolving such disputes. A clear understand ing of the grassroots reality of the SME business is essential to properly amend the legal and judicial system to serve them better.
While the laws themselves are doubtless crucial, poor implementation reduces wise legislation into a complete farce. The institutions of governance, therefore, play an equally important role in determining the development trajectory of the country. An assessment of the legal system therefore remains incomplete without a close look at the different institutions of governance and their impact on the financial environment.
The present chapter attempts an overview of the recent contributions in the law, institutions and finance literature, and to connect that literature to the situation in India.
The following section provides a selective review of the emerging law and finance literature while the third section discusses the current state of the law and institutions of governance in India particularly relative to other countries and the state of its financial markets. The fourth sectio n concludes with pointers towards future research as well as policy advice for legal and institutional reform.
II. The law, institutions and finance literature -major themes

Legal Origin, Investor Protection and Property Rights
In a series of influential papers, La Porta et al (LLSV) (1997, 1998, 2000, 2002) establish the relationship between the protection granted to investors -shareholders and creditors -in the laws of a country and the nature and evolution of its financial system squarely at the center of the finance research agenda. It is instructive to understand their basic argument.
LLSV argue that difference in the extent to which laws in different countries protect investors explain why firms are financed and owned so differently around the globe, why in some countries banks are more important than markets while the opposite if true in other cases, why firms in different countries have access to external finance to such starkly different degrees and why dispersion of shareholding is so different across countries. They demonstrate this empirically by creating measures of investor protection provided in the laws of different countries and regressing variables that represent the various issues noted above on these measures.
Importantly they note that countries almost never create a legal system from scratch. The legal structure of a country is, almost always, inherited or imported from some other system -voluntarily or otherwise (through conquest and colonization). Thus, while laws are unique to countries, legal systems stemming from the same origin are more similar than those that grow from a different foundation. Most countries around the world today have legal systems based on either the British common law or one of the civil law traditions that trace their origin to the Roman civil law coded by emperor Justinian. Among these civil law systems, the important ones are the Napoleonic French civil law and the German civil law written in 1897 after the unification of Germany under Bismarck. The Scandinavian countries seem to follow a third variant different from both these civil law systems. The primary difference between a common law system and a civil law system is that the former allows much greater role to jurisprudence as court decisions on specific cases are used as precedents for later cases, while the civil law system is more explicitly codified with less room for jurisprudence. Not surprisingly, the British common law and French civil law systems have seeded the present-day legal systems in countries that are former colonies of these powers. The German civil law has influenced the legal system of several European countries including Austria, former Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, and former Yugoslavia and Asian countries like Japan, Taiwan and Korea. While these four systems of legal origin were studied in the initial papers, in later works a fifth origin -the socialist origin -was added to capture the legal origin of many formerly Communist countries. It is important to note that while the legal systems of many countries are also shaped in part by religious traditions like Islamic law in Arab countries, Hindu law in India and Jewish law for Israel, typically these influences do not extend to the areas of commercial law and laws of contract and tort which directly affect legal rights of investors. These latter laws are almost always affected by the "secular" legal origin discussed before.
In order to assess the degree of investor protection in a country's legal system, LLSV define seven binary dummy variables and one continuous variable to capture elements of shareholder protection in the law and four binary dummy variables and one continuous variable to capture those protecting creditor rights. The variables included in shareholder protection are: (1) whether the country follows the "one share -one vote" rule; (2) if shareholders are allowed to mail their proxy to ease voting; (3) if shares are not blocked for a period before a general shareholders' meeting; (4) whether the country allows cumulative voting or proportional representation in the election of directors; (5) if the law grants a judicial venue for minority shareholders (holding 10% or less shares) to redress their grievances against management or requires company to buyback their sha res in case of dissent with regard to some fundamental changes;(6) if the law grants the shareholders first right to new issues of stock; and (7) whether the minimum percentage of shareholding required to call an extraordinary general meeting is less than their sample median of 10%. All except the first of these variables are also summed up as "antidirector rights" and, as the sum of the constituent binary variable values, anti-director rights can range from zero to six. Another variable that LLSV consider in the category of shareholder rights is the proportion of net profits companies need to distribute among shareholders as mandatory dividend (zero in case of no such clause). The "anti-director index" construct of LLSV has been criticized by some for being ad hoc and ambiguous (Pagano and Volpin 2005, Spamann 2005) . Djankov et al (DLLS, 2006) have sought to improve upon it by constructing an "anti-self-dealing" index, which measures the extent to which laws of a country prohibits or punishes dealings between firms that involve some conflict of interest.
For creditor rights, the binary elements are: (1) if the law imposes restrictions like creditors' consent to file for reorganization; (2) if there is no automatic stay on secured assets on filing the reorganization petition; (3) if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of proceeds of asset sales of a bankrupt firm; (4) if management is replaced by a representative of the court or creditors during the reorganization period. The "Creditors' rights" index, the sum of the values of these four binary variables, therefore ranges between zero and four. The continuous variable considered in addition is the minimum percentage of total share capital mandated by law to be held as reserve to avoid dissolution of the firm (zero if no such provision). Together these variables constitute measures of the degree to which investors rights are protected in the laws of a country.
LLSV find that, on average, English common law-origin countries provide best shareholder protection in terms of the "antidirector rights" and the French and German civil law-origin countries the worst. In terms of "creditor rights" too, the English common law-origin countries provide the best protection, on average, while the French civil law-origin countries provide the least protection. The differences are statistically significant.
In addition to the provision in the laws itself, LLSV examined the efficacy of the While the LLSV papers have established the importance of legal origin in explaining the nature of financial system, there are more than a single theory about the exact mechanism through which laws affect the financial system and financial decisionmaking. Beck et al (2003) empirically evaluate two broad theories. The two "transmission channels" they seek to distinguish between are the "political channel" and the "adaptability channel". The former contends that laws of different countries differ in their allocation of rights and power between the state and the private sector. Broadly speaking, the general bias is determined by the legal origin. Typically civil law countries
give fewer rights to the private individuals and institutions vis-à-vis the state as compared to the common law system. Financial institutions and markets develop best when private property and contracts are assured of freedom from state interference. As a result, civillaw countries lag behind their common-law counterparts in developing effective financial systems. On the other hand, the "adaptability channel" argues that effective functioning of financial markets and financial innovations require flexibility in the legal system to adjudicate over issues that have been unforeseen in past legislation. The common law system is marked by greater flexibility and adaptability to changes and innovations than the civil law systems because it gives more room to jurisprudence. This makes common law countries more suitable for financial development. Comparing the relative importance of these two channels in differentiating the financial development of countries with different legal origin, Beck et al (2003) conclude in favor of the adaptability channel. It seems legal origin affects financial development and the quality of financial institutions primarily because the legal system of countries with different legal origin are varyingly adaptable to changes in socioeconomic conditions and technology.
Protection of investor rights essentially implies securing property rights.
Demirguc- Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) show that firms use more external funds in countries with better property right protection. Johnson et al (2002) probe the difficult question of which is more fundamental to private sector investment -secure property rights or better access to external finance. Carrying out a survey of businesses in five transition economies -Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia and Romania -they establish that between the two variables, perceived property rights security is both necessary and sufficient for higher private sector investment. In other words, private sector reinvestment declines with a perception of poor property rights protection but after controlling for property rights protection, private sector investment is not affected by access to external funds.
Securities Laws, Regulation of Entry and Courts
Apart from the question of legal origin, which in spite of its fundamental insight, has limited policy implications, the law and finance literature has also branched off into investigating, in detail, the specific laws that affect issuance and trading of securities as well as the functioning of the legal institutions including the most important of all legal institutions, the courts themselves. This branch has also investigated the legal steps and processes required for starting a new business in several countries and measured the cost (in monetary terms plus the cost of the necessary delay) of this procedural obstacle ad its effects in different countries.
Perhaps one of the most fundamental areas of securities laws is the issuance of new securities. La Porta et al (2006) carries out a cross-country comparison of the nature of the laws and the power of the supervising authority and relates it to relative stock market development. Securities laws and institutions are compared on broadly two dimensions -the disclosure and liability standards that help bring out the most information about the issuer in a cost-efficient manner; and the nature and powers of the public enforcer of securities laws. Disclosure requirements are compared by measuring them using a "disclosure requirement index" which is the sum of six dummy variables.
These variables indicate: 1) if a prospectus is required by law; and the level of detail in information required in the prospectus on 2) compensation of individual directors and executives; 3) identity of large shareholders of the issuing company; 4) share ownership by insiders of the company; 5) irregular contracts to which the issuer is a party; and 6) related party transactions involving the issuer. Analogously, a "liability standard index" is constructed is the mean of three multi-level dummies reflecting the procedural difficulty in recovering losses, in a civil liability case for losses due to misleading statement in the prospectus from 1) the issuer and its directors; 2) the distributor; and 3) the accountant. Finally the "public enforcement index" is the mean of five measures . Their first finding is that securities laws do matter. In other words, stock markets prosper significantly more in the presence of securities laws than without them. Among the three aspects of securities laws -disclosure, liability and public enforcement -they find that while disclosure and liability standards have a clear and substantial positive impact on stock market development, the effects of public enforcement on the various measures of stock market development are not consistent. Also, disclosure and liability standards have stronger influence on stock market growth than the "anti-directors rights" index though they are moderately highly correlated. The authors speculate that this may be because these standards are the "true" proxy for the effectiveness of private contracting, or that investor protection through securities and corporate laws both matter but the former is a cleaner measure, or that both of these laws depend on similar rules that ultimate protect private investors from expropriation by corporate insiders.
Another important area where laws directly affect business growth and economic development is the creation of new businesses. Countries around the world have vastly different levels of regulations for starting new businesses and presumably this has a considerable impact on the flourishing of businesses and economic growth. Hernando de Soto was among the first people to conduct a systematic study of such regulations for a developing country (de Soto, 1990 ). More recently Djankov et al (2004) have carried out a cross-country comparison of such regulations and studied their association with economic growth.
In their sample of 85 countries, Djankov et al (2004) Greater procedural formalism is associated with longer time for dispute resolution, lower enforceability of contracts, higher corruption and lower honesty, consistency and fairness of the system. To the extent that the French civil law system is more formalized than the English common law system, the findings also imply that French civil law countries have poorer quality legal system than the English common law. Importantly they also find no clear evidence that the incentives they consider improve the quality of justice.
The "Doing Business" studies of the World Bank
Based largely on the works discussed above as well as other works by Andrei
Shleifer and his co-authors, the World Bank has been publishing its annual "Doing Business" reports (World Bank 2004 , 2006 Much of the findings of these reports are along the lines of studies mentioned (indeed these academic papers constitute the main background papers for these reports).
Employment regulation is an area not discussed above. Employment regulation includes laws that regulate: i) part-time hiring; ii) number of working hours in a day and annual leave; iii) minimum wage; iv) grounds for dismissal. As in all other categories, there is considerable cross-country variation in employment regulations. The Doing Business reports are of the view that more stringent employment regulation limits job creation, reduces wo rkforce flexibility and results in smaller firm size with less-than-efficient scale. More importantly, greater regulation appears to hurt employment and welfare of disadvantaged groups to rise from poverty.
The overall conclusions of the Doing Business reports are: i) poor countries regulate business the most; ii) greater regulation is associated with bad socio-economic outcomes; iii) there is indeed an "ideal" set of regulations or "best practices" that can be adopted and emulated across the globe with beneficial results. These reports have been a strong votary of legal reforms in countries around the world to bring about better economic effects.
III. Law and finance in India -a selective overview
Investor Protection in Indian Laws: An international comparison
The Indian legal system is obviously built on the English common law system. In terms of property rights protection, La Porta et al (2004) give India a score of 3 on an index ranging from 1 to 5. As for investor protection, on paper the Indian system provides one of the highest levels of investor protection in the world. India has a shareholder rights index of 5 (out of a maximum possible of 6), highest in the La Porta et al (1998) Shareholder Meeting is 10% -less than the sample average. There is no provision of mandatory dividends in India.
In terms of creditor rights, too, the Indian legal system seems to provide the best protection to creditors in the world according to the La Porta et al (1998) Thus it appears that Indian laws provide great protection of shareholders' rights on paper while the application and enforcement of those laws are lamentable.
The corruption figures are even worse. On this dimension, India has a score of 4.58 as compared to the sample average of 6.90 ranking 44 th out of 49 nations -better only than Egypt, Nigeria, Philippines, Pakistan and Indonesia. The risk of expropriation by the state in India has a score of 7.75 slightly worse than the sample average of 8.05.
As for the risk of contract repudiation, India ranks 38 th with a score of 6.11 as opposed to the sample average of 7.58. In terms of accounting standards, India appears to have the worst accounting standard among the English-origin countries (a score of 57) rated though several civil law countries fare worse. The sample average on this dimension is 60.93. Somewhat surprisingly for people with experiences of Indian judiciary, India gets a score of 8 out of 10 on the efficiency of judicial system variable, just behind the English-law average of 8.15 and better than the overall sample average of 7.67.
Financial/Business Laws and Regulations in India
Red tape and regulations are among the leading deterrents for business and foreign investment in India and much of the economic reforms centers around reducing these obstacles. Perhaps a sense of India's legal restrictions and institutions can be obtained from its latest ranking of 116 out of 155 in World Bank's Ease of Doing Business indicator in 2006 (World Bank, 2006) . Table 1 Panel A shows India's ranking on the various aspects of business regulation. India features consistently in the second half of the sample for all but one aspect, and is out of the top 100 for most aspects. The one outlier aspects in this regard, interestingly, is investor protection. Panel B of Table 1 describes the various measures for India that leads to this state of affairs.
[ Table 1 Hiring and particularly firing people are just as difficult. It is almost twice as hard to hire people in India as in OECD countries and almost three times as hard and costly to fire them. Apparently labor-friendly regulations have proven costly to India in terms of development and growth, ironically, mostly for labor itself. Different Indian states have cons iderable variation in their labor laws. In an interesting study, Besley and Burgess (2004) show that during the three and half decades before liberalization began, Indian states that followed more pro-worker policies experienced lower output, investment, employment and productivity in the registered or "formal" sector and higher urban poverty. They have also been marked with an increase in informal sector output, which supports the findings of the cross-country analysis by Botero et al (2004) .
As we noted before, the degree of investor protection in the laws is the strongest suit for India followed by "getting credit". In the latter case, India lags behind not because of creditors' rights (which is close to OECD standards) but because of the paucity of credit quality information through the use of public registry or coverage of private bureaus. However, to get a more realistic picture of India's excellent investor protection provisions in the law, they must be viewed together with her performance in contract enforcement is where the number of procedures and time delays are about double that in OECD countries and the costs of contract enforcement over four times that in OECD countries.
An important area investor protection is obviously that of securities markets regulation. Using the framework of La Porta et al (2006) that focuses on disclosure and liability requirements as well as the quality of public enforcement of the regulations controlling securities markets, India scores 0.92 in the index of disclosure requirements.
Only two countries in the La Porta et al (2006) sample of 49 countries -United States and Singapore -have a higher score. As for liability standard, India's score is 0.66 while the sample mean is 0.47. Only four countries -Canada, USA, Netherlands, and Philippines -have higher scores. In terms of the quality of public enforcement, i.e. the nature and powers of the supervisory authority, the Securities and Exchanges Board of India (SEBI), India scores 0.67, higher than the overall sample mean as well as the English-origin average of 0.52 and 0.62 respectively and ranks 14 th in the sample.
In terms of the constituent elements of the La Porta (2006) disclosure index, Indian share offerings do require a mandatory prospectus and the prospectus must list the remuneration of individual directors and the managing director (but not that of other officers), the detailed shareholding of the ten largest shareholders as well as the promoters' (insiders) shareholding in the company, any contract that the company is a party to except for those required for day-to-day functioning of the company, and all related party transactions. As for liability, the directors of the issuing company and the distributor (merchant banker) of the issue are liable for any untrue statements in the prospectus and the offence is punishable with fine and/or imprisonment but the standard of establishment of guilt requires proving that i) an untrue statement existed in the prospectus; ii) it led to losses for an investor relying on the statement; iii) it was not an "honest" mistake. The accountant to the issue is not directly liable to SEBI but is likely to face an inquiry from the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India for a serious omission or untrue statement.
As for the quality of public enforcement, all board members of the supervisor, cases, even a High Court, a case can easily be dragged for three to four years during which time the sale of the seized asset cannot take place. It is perhaps too soon to evaluate its effects on reducing defaults but public sector banks have had some success recovering their loans by seizing and selling assets since the Act came into existence.
The area of the Ease of Doing Business index where India fares worst is undoubtedly that of closing a business. India has the dubious distinction of being among the countries where it takes the longest time to go through bankruptcy in the world (10 years on an average). Consequently recovery rates are very low too -below 13% as opposed to about 74% in OECD countries. Kang and Nayar (2004) proved to be largely ineffective. As for complaints about transfer of shares and nonreceipt of dividends while the redress rate has been an impressive 95%, there were still over 135,000 complaints pending with the SEBI. Thus there is considerable room for improvement on the enforcement side of the Indian legal system to help develop the corporate governance mechanism in the country.
Indian Courts -an assessment
A discussion of the legal situation in a country remains incomplete without an assessment of the functioning of its courts of la w. Great laws can be brought to naught by an inefficient judicial system or a corrupt judiciary. Presumably one of the main reasons why Indian laws look better on paper than in practice is the inefficiency of the Indian judicial system. Djankov et al (2003) in their analysis of "formalism" in the judicial process around the world, gave India a score of 3.34 on its formalism index, higher than the English-origin average of 2.76 but slightly lower than the average for all countries, 3.53.
Among the 42 English-origin countries in their sample, India has the 11 th highest level of About 63% of pending civil cases are over a year old and 31% are over 3 years old.
Automatic appeals, extensive litigation by the government, underdeveloped alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution like arbitration, the shortfall of judges all contribute to this unenviable state of affairs in Indian courts. Since the same courts try both civil and criminal matters and the latter gets priority, economic disputes suffer even greater delays.
The Indian Financial sector -a brief overview
In a While the government bond market account for 37% of GDP, the corporate bond market is rudimentary and virtually stagnant at 2%. Government bonds are also held mostly by institutions. The privately placed corporate debt is 10 times as large as the publicly traded corporate bond market. Interestingly the size of international corporate bonds issued by Indian companies amount to more than 50% greater than the publicly tradable corporate bonds in India.
In terms of modern payment systems while over 70% of large-value payments are now handled electronically, the retail payment system is predominantly cash-based (about 97% of transactions). This is reflected in the relatively large amount currency in circulation in India, close to 12% of GDP.
In terms of the measures employed by the various La Porta et al studies (figures relate to mid-to-late 90s), Ind ia had 7.79 companies per million citizens in 1994, one of the lowest for English-origin countries but higher than many French-origin countries and even Germany. Nevertheless it is considerably short of the sample average of 21.59. As for the ratio of external capital to GNP, India has a score of 0.31 which puts it at about the middle of the pack of English-origin countries though the ratio is significantly less than the average English-origin figure of 0.6. It is also less than the overall sample average of 0.4. As for companies making IPOs, Indian firms made 1.24 IPOs during 1995-1996 per million citizen, less than the English-origin average of 2.23 but greater than the sample average of 1.02. Ownership concentration in India as measured by the median share of three largest shareholders in a firm India had a figure of 43% in between the English-origin and overall sample averages of 42% and 45% respectively. In terms of debt, Indian firms had an average debt of 47% of sales substantially higher than the English-origin and overall sample averages of 0.26 and 0.27 respectively.
Survey evidence on law and finance from India
An important question that needs to be answered in understanding the connection between law and finance in India concerns the extent to which the formal legal environment directly supports and regulates businesses, particularly small and medium enterprises which form an increasingly important part of the Indian industry. Allen et al Over 80% of the firms surveyed needed a license to start a business, and for about 47% obtaining it was a difficult process. Government officials were most often the problem solved usually through payment of bribes (87% of responses) or friends of government officials to negotiate (23%). Clearly, networks and connections are of crucial importanc e in negotiating the government bureaucracy.
As for conducting day-to-day business, legal concerns are far less important to them than the unwritten codes of the informal networks in which firms operate. In cases of default, the primary concern is loss of reputation, followed closely by loss of property, while in situations of breach of contract, loss of future business opportunities ranks the highest, followed by loss of reputation. Significantly, in both cases, the fear of legal consequences is the least important concern lower than even threats to personal safety.
About 50% of the firms surveyed do not have a regular legal adviser and less than half of those that do have lawyers in that capacity. The most common reason cited was that lawyers are not necessary as the businessmen knew all their business partners and could deal with them fairly. For mediation in a business dispute or to enforce a contract, the first choice are "mutual friends or business partners," followed closely by "settling out of court with the help of legal advisers". Only 20% of the respondents mentioned going to courts as the first option indicating that the legal system, while not as effective as the informal mechanisms, is not altogether absent. As for the mechanism to ensure payment or repayment going to court leaving negotiation possibilities open was the most common response followed by better screening borrowers/clients. Some asserted they would seize the defaulters' personal assets themselves. Clearly, the courts, while not the most popular method of conflict resolution, do have their utility as a negotiating tool.
The informal system, however, is not perfect in resolving disputes and has its costs. Over 48% of the respondents experienced a breach of contract or non-payment with a supplier or major customer in the past three years. 35% of them renegotiated while 43% did nothing but continued the business relationships with the defaulting parties. .
In general, the business environment of the SME sector is marked by strong informal mechanisms like family ties, reputation and trust. Legal remedies though present, are far less important than the rules of the informal networks. Ownership and management are not effectively separated. Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) connect the distance between ownership and control to different legal environments, and show that family-run rather than professionally managed firms will dominate in settings with weak minority shareholder protection. Consistent with this environment, external finance for small firms in India comes mostly from family and friends, followed by trade credits.
IV. Conclusion and future research
Legal reforms are viewed to be among the most important "second generation"
reforms for developing countries embracing the markets economy. The specifics of necessary legal reforms, which would lead to the flourishing of markets, however, are less widely understood. We review the recent literature on law and finance and assess the state of India's legal and judicial system as well as its financial system, particularly relative to the rest of the world.
It appears that Indian laws provide good to excellent protection to investor rights, at least on paper. Implementation of these laws, however, has been less than satisfactory.
Public enforcement of securities laws has been weak and courts in India have been extremely slow and overloaded with cases. Even a decade and a half after the beginning of the reforms process, India still suffers from too much business regulation and red-tape and bureaucracy (not to speak of corruption) pose hurdles on every major aspect of business. Consequently, it is perhaps not surprising that the Indian financial markets have had limited though increasing depth and that survey evidence reveals the preponderance of internal financing among India's small and medium sector firms as well as a far greater reliance of small businesses in India on informal networks and institutions like reputation and trust rather than the formal legal system to enforce contracts and settle disputes.
Much still remains unknown. The identification of the specific shortcomings of main legislations and a clear understanding of the mechanism through which they have hindered development of financial markets in India are lacking. This can be done through a careful analysis of past court judgments in cases involving these laws -a focus that cannot be expected in cross-country studies that have to, to some extent, sacrifice depth of analysis for the sake of comp arability across countries. A sense of the seriousness of the problems identified in terms of value lost or growth rate reduced can be estimated as well using international benchmarks, so as to prioritize the areas for legal reform. The specific regulations that can be reduced or eliminated for the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) can also be identified through this process. These findings would help set the agenda for legal reforms in India that could spur further growth and development in the Indian financia l markets. 
